SARS-CoV Sampling from 3 Portals by Tong, Tommy R.
LETTERS
SARS-CoV
Sampling from 
3 Portals
To the Editor: Wang et al. detect-
ed severe acute respiratory syn-
drome–associated coronavirus (SARS-
CoV) from throat wash and saliva
specimens and suggested that these
specimens have advantages over
other specimens, including ease of
procurement and safety for medical
personnel (1). The virus has been
detected with variable success from
nasopharyngeal aspirates, nose and
throat swabs, and tears (2,3).
Advocates of all of these sampling
methods emphasize the need for early
diagnosis of SARS. The probability
for nosocomial transmission to
healthcare workers when they obtain
specimens from patients has not been
adequately addressed. In a study of
outbreak control for SARS, Chowell
et al. suggest “… the strong sensitiv-
ity of R0 to the transmission rate
β  indicates that efforts in finding
intervention strategies that manage to
systematically lower the contact rate
of persons of all age groups promise
an effective means for lowering R0”
(4).
An important component of a
comprehensive strategy to lower the
contact rate is improving the safety
measures recommended for clinical
specimen collection by healthcare
workers. Recognizing the importance
of obtaining multiple specimens and
the difficulties associated with obtain-
ing samples from the 3 usual portals
of entry, we devised and tested a
novel method of specimen collection,
conjunctiva–upper respiratory tract
irrigation (5). We coupled our speci-
men collection method with detailed
written instructions to enable the
patients themselves to perform the
entire procedures. Almost all other
specimen collection methods require
assistance from healthcare workers or
have other limitations, such as inabil-
ity to sample all 3 portals. The method
is not perfect because some persons
have difficulty performing the proce-
dure; however, self-instillation of the
irrigation into the nostrils, with or
without the addition of a throat wash
or saliva, is likely to improve the suc-
cess rate. The data supplied by Loon
et al. (3) and Wang et al. (1) confirm
that collecting specimens by a method
that involves minimal contact
between a possible source of infection
and susceptible persons is desirable.
The author has shares of a company
that owns a patent-pending conjunctiva-
upper respiratory tract irrigation system.
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Occupational
Health Response 
to SARS 
To the Editor: Severe acute respi-
ratory syndrome (SARS), an occupa-
tional disease risk for healthcare
workers, warrants an occupational
health response, as clearly described
by Esswein et al. (1). Occupational
health  professionals played a role in
the assessment of healthcare facilities
in Taiwan and many other countries.
For example, occupational health pro-
fessionals were invited to perform
audits in at least 2 hospitals in
Singapore during the height of the cri-
sis, (2) and to conduct follow-up dis-
cussions with the hospital manage-
ment. In addition to assessment of the
industrial hygiene aspects, which
included evaluating the ventilation
modifications needed for effective
infection control, temperature and
humidity were significant factors
affecting the use of protective gear in
a tropical country like Singapore. The
occupational health audits included
site inspections and reviews of work
processes of those areas where actual
transmission of SARS had occurred
and where triage of febrile patients
was taking place. Other issues identi-
fied as requiring urgent attention were
providing sufficient rest, shower, and
changing facilities for staff, monitor-
ing staff sickness absenteeism, and
proactively managing staff mental
health. Occupational health physi-
cians subsequently served on hospital
SARS debriefing committees that
reviewed institutional shortcomings
and recommended new measures for
future outbreaks. An occupational
health service unit headed by a trained
occupational health physician was
formed in 1 hospital.
Other occupational groups, as well
as healthcare workers, are also at
potential risk. These groups may
include the following: 1) food han-
dlers, defined as persons who handle,
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